The Sinking of El Faro

[Jason2tpa]

This article is making it's way around maritime forums like this. For those whom have yet to read the article and it's chilling details, here ya go:

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018...ter-in-decades

[fairdeal]

some decent writing there IMO
very sad that a competent captain would end up killing himself and 32 crew
from feeling he had to suck up to the bosses

and of course, the similar dynamic, between the officers and the captain -
failures known, I believe, to the aviation guys here as "****pit resource management"

[oldmako69]

Ultimately, money is what killed that crew. Money in the form of time (keeping to the schedule) and a few hundred gallons of fuel. The Captain pressed on in spite of overwhelming evidence, likely out of fear of repercussions from his bosses. Now, the ship and its crew are on the bottom, as is all the cargo. In retrospect, it seems so obvious, but managers will be managers and employees will sometimes succumb to pressure. Stupid.

Another good story is that of The Marine Electric. An old boat badly in need of repair, it sailed from Norfolk to Boston in 1983. The ship entered a storm, took on excessive water through its poorly maintained and damaged hatches and sunk off the coast of Virginia. The ships' owners tried to hang the crew but ultimately were found to blame for the sub-standard maintenance in spite of overwhelming evidence pointing to faulty hatches. Stupid.

The crew repeatedly wrote the vessel up and highlighted its need for repair$. The company repeatedly pushed back and cut corners on $afety. Then, after the sinking, the company did everything within their power to point the finger of blame directly at the Captain and crew. This type of behavior is still common in the airline industry among not only lower tier players, but in the big dogs as well. Its rampant in other countries.

More -

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Marine_Electric

The Marine Electric put to sea for her final voyage on 10 February 1983, sailing from Norfolk, Virginia to Somerset, Massachusetts with a cargo of 24,800 tons of granulated coal. The ship sailed through a fierce (and ultimately record-breaking) storm that was gathering.

The Marine Electric neared the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay at about 2:00 a.m. on Thursday, 10 February. She battled 25-foot (7.6-m) waves and winds gusting to more than 55 miles per hour (89 km/h), fighting the storm to reach port with her cargo.

The following day, she was contacted by the United States Coast Guard to turn back to assist a fishing vessel, the Theodora, that was taking on water. The Theodora eventually recovered and proceeded on its westerly course back to Virginia; the Marine Electric turned north to resume its original route.

During the course of the investigation into the ship’s sinking, representatives of MTL theorized that the ship ran aground during her maneuvering to help the Theodora, fatally damaging the hull. They contended that it was this grounding that caused the Marine Electric to sink five hours later.

But Coast Guard investigations, and independent examinations of the wreck, told a different story: the Marine Electric left port in an un-seaworthy condition, with gaping holes in its deck plating and hatch covers. The hatch covers, in particular, posed a problem, since without them the cargo hold could fill with water in the storm and drag the ship under. And it was there that the investigation took a second, dramatic turn.

****Investigators discovered that much of the paperwork supporting MTL's declarations that the Marine Electric was seaworthy was faked. Inspection records showed inspections of the hatch covers during periods where they'd in fact been removed from the ship for maintenance; inspections were recorded during periods of time when the ship wasn't even in port. A representative of the hatch covers' manufacturer warned MTL in 1982 that their condition posed a threat to the ship’s seaworthiness. But inspectors never tested them. And yet, the Marine Electric was repeatedly certified as seaworthy.

Part of the problem was that the Coast Guard delegated some of its inspection authority to the American Bureau of Shipping. The ABS is a private, non-profit agency that developed rules, standards and guidelines for ship's hulls. In the wake of the Marine Electric tragedy, questions were raised about how successfully the ABS was exercising the inspection authority delegated to it, as well as about whether the Coast Guard even had the authority to delegate that role. Also there was a conflict of interest in that the inspection fees paid to the ABS were paid by the ship owners.

In the wake of the Marine Electric sinking, The Philadelphia Inquirer assigned two reporters, Tim Dwyer and Robert Frump, to look into old ship catastrophes. In the series, the writers concluded that government programs designed to strengthen the merchant marine had actually kept unsafe ships afloat. Frump later wrote a book, Until the Sea Shall Free Them, about the sinking.

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/...hall_Free_Them

In the wake of the Marine Board report, and the newspaper's investigation, the Coast Guard dramatically changed its inspection and oversight procedures. The Coast Guard report noted that the ABS, in particular, "cannot be considered impartial", and described its failure to notice the critical problems with the ship as negligent. At the same time, the report noted that "the inexperience of the inspectors who went aboard the Marine Electric, and their failure to recognize the safety hazards...raises doubt about the capabilities of the Coast Guard inspectors to enforce the laws and regulations in a satisfactory manner."

While the Coast Guard commandant did not accept all of the recommendations of the Marine Board report, inspections tightened and more than 70 old World War II relics still functioning 40 years after the war were sent to scrap yards. In 2003, Coast Guard Captain Dominic Calicchio was posthumously awarded The Plimsoll Award by Professional Mariner magazine in part because of his role as a member of the Marine Board of Investigation.^[3]

Additionally, the Coast Guard required that survival suits be required on all winter North Atlantic runs. Later, as a direct result of the casualties on the Marine Electric, Congress pushed for and the Coast Guard eventually established the now famous Coast Guard Rescue Swimmer program.

[panasonic]

Almighty dollar and sked at work again. He was not truly the captain of that ship if he had to call in every move he made. ...sad story.

[fairdeal]

great line in that piece:

"It is said among merchant mariners that, yes,
a captain has the authority to refuse orders he deems to be unsafe—
but probably only once. "

[boscoe99]

Pilots and Captains are damned if they do and damned if they don't.

If they are nervous nellies and refuse to fly/sail in rough weather then they won't be pilots/captains for long. Hopefully they will get enough experience under their belts before they and their pax get hurt. But experience can breed contempt. After a pilot has made a thousand approaches in stormy weather or a captain has sailed through a thousand storms what is but one more bad storm? How is he to know it will be his last?

Meanwhile, if a pilot cancels a flight or a captain cancels or diverts a voyage then all hell breaks loose in the form of complaining passengers, shippers and owners.

Society seems to now expect a world without any risk. A world that I don't live in.

[oldmako69]

The motto of the Air Line Pilots Association is Schedule with Safety. Depending on the parent company, a Captain can refuse a particular airplane for a particular flight without fear of reprisal. However, with that authority comes responsibility. The Federal Aviation Regulations are quite clear in that the Captain is the ultimate authority with regard to his flight. But not all airlines and not all Captains are alike.

That this Captain chose that particular path to get to his destination seems completely mindless to me. But, I don't work on a boat and my input is taken seriously by almost every one of the guys I work with. There will always be second guessing in an accident or incident, just as there will always be second guessing of the guy whose opinion is more conservative and 'safer'. It's a dynamic environment and stuff happens.

Junior officers input is not only considered, it is requested where I work. That the crew was mocking this particular captain says a LOT to me. He had a reputation.

[Jason2tpa]

Should the sinking of El Faro ever become a movie, the recorded dialogue captured between Capt, officers, and crew just prior to their ultimate demise would not need to be rewritten for the screen. I couldn't imagine making it a more dramatic scene...most notably when one of the crew is struggling to make his way to safety and asks the Capt if he was going to leave him...the Capt responding by saying, No I will not leave you. Geez, chilling.

[panasonic]

Ultimately, money is what killed that crew. Money in the form of time (keeping to the schedule) and a few hundred gallons of fuel. The Captain pressed on in spite of overwhelming evidence, likely out of fear of repercussions from his bosses. Now, the ship and its crew are on the bottom, as is all the cargo. In retrospect, it seems so obvious, but managers will be managers and employees will sometimes succumb to pressure. Stupid.

Another good story is that of The Marine Electric. An old boat badly in need of repair, it sailed from Norfolk to Boston in 1983. The ship entered a storm, took on excessive water through its poorly maintained and damaged hatches and sunk off the coast of Virginia. The ships' owners tried to hang the crew but ultimately were found to blame for the sub-standard maintenance in spite of overwhelming evidence pointing to faulty hatches. Stupid.

The crew repeatedly wrote the vessel up and highlighted its need for repair$. The company repeatedly pushed back and cut corners on $afety. Then, after the sinking, the company did everything within their power to point the finger of blame directly at the Captain and crew. This type of behavior is still common in the airline industry among not only lower tier players, but in the big dogs as well. Its rampant in other countries.

More -

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Marine_Electric

The Marine Electric put to sea for her final voyage on 10 February 1983, sailing from Norfolk, Virginia to Somerset, Massachusetts with a cargo of 24,800 tons of granulated coal. The ship sailed through a fierce (and ultimately record-breaking) storm that was gathering.

The Marine Electric neared the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay at about 2:00 a.m. on Thursday, 10 February. She battled 25-foot (7.6-m) waves and winds gusting to more than 55 miles per hour (89 km/h), fighting the storm to reach port with her cargo.

The following day, she was contacted by the United States Coast Guard to turn back to assist a fishing vessel, the Theodora, that was taking on water. The Theodora eventually recovered and proceeded on its westerly course back to Virginia; the Marine Electric turned north to resume its original route.

During the course of the investigation into the ship’s sinking, representatives of MTL theorized that the ship ran aground during her maneuvering to help the Theodora, fatally damaging the hull. They contended that it was this grounding that caused the Marine Electric to sink five hours later.

But Coast Guard investigations, and independent examinations of the wreck, told a different story: the Marine Electric left port in an un-seaworthy condition, with gaping holes in its deck plating and hatch covers. The hatch covers, in particular, posed a problem, since without them the cargo hold could fill with water in the storm and drag the ship under. And it was there that the investigation took a second, dramatic turn.

****Investigators discovered that much of the paperwork supporting MTL's declarations that the Marine Electric was seaworthy was faked. Inspection records showed inspections of the hatch covers during periods where they'd in fact been removed from the ship for maintenance; inspections were recorded during periods of time when the ship wasn't even in port. A representative of the hatch covers' manufacturer warned MTL in 1982 that their condition posed a threat to the ship’s seaworthiness. But inspectors never tested them. And yet, the Marine Electric was repeatedly certified as seaworthy.

Part of the problem was that the Coast Guard delegated some of its inspection authority to the American Bureau of Shipping. The ABS is a private, non-profit agency that developed rules, standards and guidelines for ship's hulls. In the wake of the Marine Electric tragedy, questions were raised about how successfully the ABS was exercising the inspection authority delegated to it, as well as about whether the Coast Guard even had the authority to delegate that role. Also there was a conflict of interest in that the inspection fees paid to the ABS were paid by the ship owners.

In the wake of the Marine Electric sinking, The Philadelphia Inquirer assigned two reporters, Tim Dwyer and Robert Frump, to look into old ship catastrophes. In the series, the writers concluded that government programs designed to strengthen the merchant marine had actually kept unsafe ships afloat. Frump later wrote a book, Until the Sea Shall Free Them, about the sinking.

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/...hall_Free_Them

In the wake of the Marine Board report, and the newspaper's investigation, the Coast Guard dramatically changed its inspection and oversight procedures. The Coast Guard report noted that the ABS, in particular, "cannot be considered impartial", and described its failure to notice the critical problems with the ship as negligent. At the same time, the report noted that "the inexperience of the inspectors who went aboard the Marine Electric, and their failure to recognize the safety hazards...raises doubt about the capabilities of the Coast Guard inspectors to enforce the laws and regulations in a satisfactory manner."

While the Coast Guard commandant did not accept all of the recommendations of the Marine Board report, inspections tightened and more than 70 old World War II relics still functioning 40 years after the war were sent to scrap yards. In 2003, Coast Guard Captain Dominic Calicchio was posthumously awarded The Plimsoll Award by Professional Mariner magazine in part because of his role as a member of the Marine Board of Investigation.^[3]

Additionally, the Coast Guard required that survival suits be required on all winter North Atlantic runs. Later, as a direct result of the casualties on the Marine Electric, Congress pushed for and the Coast Guard eventually established the now famous Coast Guard Rescue Swimmer program.

Great story...will read that book.

[oldmako69]

One thing my post largely glossed over was the role of Dominic Calicchio. It's been a decade or more since I read the book, but as I recall, he was the one who insured that the crew of the M.E. got the benefit of the doubt when most everyone else was ready to lay the blame squarely at their feet. He had served in the merchant marine and knew the lengths that ship owners would go to screw their crews at the first hint of potential liability. The book does a great job of showing this, and his steps to ensure that all the crew was treated fairly.

http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2016/0...y-regulations/

[boscoe99]

Maybe we need full time recording (video and audio) for every crew member on every train, bus, airplane, ship, whatever that departs on every voyage. The data will automatically be uploaded real time to computers that run programs to analyze the actions of the crew and the environment they are operating in. Find the risk takers. Home base can call the crew to tell them to take alternative actions when necessary. Take their licenses away from them if needed if they don't change their ways. Put them in jail if necessary.

Looking back on my time in the US Navy my life was put at risk when we sailed into a terrible storm in the North Pacific. The officers should have been relieved of duty and court marshalled for putting the ship and its members into harms way.

If one life is saved it will all be worth it.

[oldmako69]

Most professional pilots, air or sea would never go for that. Neither would surgeons, attorneys, congressmen, Senators etc.

Who checks the checkers? While there are ways to mitigate risk, micromanaging the guys who's lives are on the line isn't one. Had that guy not been so tied up with the schedule and fuel, (and by this I mean oversight by the people most concerned by co$t, not $afety) I have ten bucks that says he would have gone the longer route and whistled the whole way. He allowed testosterone poisoning (self induced....'I drove boats in Alaska....this is chicken shit') and fear of retribution (penny pinching desk jockeys) to cloud his judgement. Given enough willing exposure to this type of risk, the results were inevitable.